Suchergebnisse

In order to offer a balanced assessment of the role of minimum wages in the Welfare State, seven basic questions need to be answered: (i) Why is the minimum wage a useful redistributive tool?; (ii) How binding are minimum wage floors in different countries?; (iii) To what extent do minimum wages have the adverse consequences that standard analysis predict?; (iv) Are there strong theoretical grounds underlying the revisionist results?; (v) Who supports minimum wages?; (vi) Under which conditions is the minimum wage a better tool than other policy instruments to achieve income redistribution?; and, finally, (vii) What is the overall cross-country time-series evidence regarding the employment effect of the minima? The aim of this paper is to provide an appraisal on the available evidence for each of the above-mentioned issues.

Both parts of Volume 44 of Advances in Econometrics pay tribute to Fabio Canova for his major contributions to economics over the last four decades. Throughout his long and distinguished career, Canova's research has achieved both a prolific publication record and provided stellar research to the profession. His colleagues, co-authors and PhD students wish to express their deep gratitude to Fabio for his intellectual leadership and guidance, whilst showcasing the extensive advances in knowledge and theory made available by Canova for professionals in the field. Advances in Econometrics publishes original scholarly econometrics papers with the intention of expanding the use of developed and emerging econometric techniques by disseminating ideas on the theory and practice of econometrics throughout the empirical economic, business and social science literature. Annual volume themes, selected by the Series Editors, are their interpretation of important new methods and techniques emerging in economics, statistics and the social sciences.

Three features of real-life reforms of dual employment protection legislation (EPL) systems are particularly hard to study through the lens of standard labor-market search models: (i) the excess job turnover implied by dual EPL, (ii) the nonretroactive nature of EPL reforms, and (iii) the transition dynamics from dual to a unified EPL system. In this paper, we develop a computationally tractable model addressing these issues. Our main finding is that the welfare gains of reforming a dual EPL system are sizeable and achieved mostly through a decrease in turnover at short job tenures. This conclusion continues to hold in more general settings featuring wage rigidities, heterogeneity in productivity upon matching, and human capital accumulation. We also find substantial cross-sectional heterogeneity in welfare effects along the transition to a unified EPL scheme. Given that the model is calibrated to data from Spain, often considered as the epitome of a labor market with dual EPL, our results should provide guidance for a wide range of reforms of dual EPL systems.

Three features of real-life reforms of dual employment protection legislation (EPL) systems are particularly hard to study through the lens of standard labour-market search models: (i) the excess job turnover implied by dual EPL, (ii) the non-retroactive nature of EPL reforms, and (iii) the transition dynamics from dual to a unified EPL system. In this paper, we develop a computationally tractable model addressing these issues. Our main finding is that the welfare gains of reforming a dual EPL system are sizeable and achieved mostly through a decrease in turnover at short job tenures. This conclusion continues to hold in more general settings featuring wage rigidities, heterogeneity in productivity upon matching, and human capital accumulation. We also find substantial cross-sectional heterogeneity in welfare effects along the transition to a unified EPL scheme. Given that the model is calibrated to data from Spain, often considered as the epitome of a labour market with dual EPL, our results should provide guidance for a wide range of reforms of dual EPL systems.

This paper analyses the optimal design of a single open-ended contract (SOEC) and studies the political economy of moving towards such a SOEC in a labour market where employment protection is highly discontinuous. We develop a computationally tractable approach to compare two economic environments: one with a large employment protection gap after a short tenure, and another one with a SOEC featuring a smooth tenure profile. For illustrative purposes, we specialise the discussion of such choices to Spain, a country often considered as an epitome of a labour market with dual employment protection. We show that a SOEC has the potential of bringing substantial improvements in equilibrium allocations and welfare. We provide estimates for the eligibility rule and tenure profile of the optimal SOEC, defined as the contract maximising the steady-state lifetime utility of new labour-market entrants. Finally, we use the model to identify winners and losers among younger and older workers in the transitional path of such a reform, and evaluate its political support.

Published: December 2015 ; This paper analyses the optimal design of a single open-ended contract (SOEC) and studies the political economy of moving towards such a SOEC in a labour market with dual employment protection. We develop a computationally tractable approach to compare two economic environments: one with flexible entry-level jobs and high employment protection at longer tenures, and another one with a SOEC featuring employment protection levels that increase smoothly with tenure. For illustrative purposes, we specialise the discussion of such choices to Spain, a country often considered as an epitome of a dual labour market. We show that a SOEC has the potential of bringing substantial improvements in equilibrium allocations and welfare. We provide estimates for the eligibility rule and tenure profile of the optimal SOEC, defined as the contract maximising the steady-state lifetime utility of new labour- market entrants. Finally, we use the model to identify winners and losers among younger and older workers in the transitional path of such a reform, and evaluate its political support.

This paper analyzes the optimal design of a single open-ended contract (SOEC) and studies the political economy of moving towards such a SOEC in a dual labour market. We compare two economic environments: one with flexible entry-level jobs and high employment protection at long tenure, and another with a SOEC featuring employment protection levels that increase smoothly with tenure. For illustrative purposes, we specialize the discussion of such choices to Spain. A SOEC has the potential of bringing big time efficiency and welfare gains in a steady-state sense. We also identify winners and losers in the transitional path of such a reform and analyze its political support.

SUMMARY
The Great Recession has strongly influenced employment patterns across skill and gender groups in EU countries. We analyse how these changes in workforce composition might distort comparisons of conventional measures of gender wage gaps via non-random selection of workers into EU labour markets. We document that male selection (traditionally disregarded) has become positive during the recession, particularly in Southern Europe. As for female selection (traditionally positive), our findings are twofold. Following an increase in the labour-force participation of less-skilled women, due to an added-worker effect, these biases declined in some countries where new female entrants were able to find jobs, whereas they went up in other countries which suffered large female employment losses. Finally, we document that most of these changes in selection patterns were reversed during the subsequent recovery phase, confirming their cyclical nature.

This paper provides an overview of recent research on dual labour markets. Theoretical and empirical contributions on the labour-market effects of dual employment protection legislation are revisited, as well as factors behind its resilience and policies geared towards correcting its negative economic and social consequences. The topics covered include the stepping-stone or dead-end nature of temporary contracts, their effects on employment, unemployment, churn, training, productivity growth, wages, and labour market inflows and outflows. The paper reviews both theoretical advances and relevant policy discussions on a very relevant topic in many European countries, in particular in several that had a very poor employment performance during the recent global economic and financial crisis.

The aim of this paper is to evaluate the role played by selectivity issues induced by nonemployment in explaining gender wage gap patterns in the EU since the onset of the Great Recession. We show that male selection into the labour market, traditionally/ndisregarded, has increased. This is particularly the case in peripheral European countries, where dramatic drops in male unskilled jobs have taken place during the crisis. As regards female selection, traditionally positive, we document mixed findings. While it has declined in some countries, as a result of increasing female LFP due to an added-worker effect, it has become even more positive in other countries. This is due to adverse labour demand shifts in industries which are intensive in temporary work where women are overrepresented. These adverse shifts may have more than offset the rise in unskilled female labour supply. ; The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396.

Abstract
This paper presents a case study on reforming a very dysfunctional labor market with a deep insider-outsider divide, namely the Spanish case. We show how a dual market, with permanent and temporary employees, makes real reform much harder, and leads to purely marginal changes that do not alter the fundamental features of labour market institutions. While the Great Recession and the start of the sovereign debt crisis have lately triggered two labor reforms, the political economy equilibrium has not allowed them to be transformational enough.

JEL codes

H29; J23; J38; J41; J64

This paper presents a case study on reforming a very dysfunctional labor market with a deep insider-outsider divide, namely the Spanish case. We show how a dual market, with permanent and temporary employees, makes real reform much harder, and leads to purely marginal changes that do not alter the fundamental features of labour market institutions. While the Great Recession and the start of the sovereign debt crisis have lately triggered two labor reforms, the political economy equilibrium has not allowed them to be transformational enough.